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Soft Law and Transnational Standards in Arbitration:  The Challenge of Res Judicata 
 
William W. Park* 
The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience.† 
Abstract 
Among the legal artifacts of international arbitration, few prove more significant in practice than 
the norms governing the nitty gritty conduct of proceedings in matters like evidence and 
discovery.  In proceedings between adversaries from different countries, a transnational “soft 
law” often finds expression in rules, guidelines and canons of professional associations which 
serve to supplement the “hard law” of national statutes and court decisions.  Memorializing the 
experience of those who sit as arbitrators or serve as counsel, such standards contain a degree of 
circularity, in that relevant norms both derive from and apply to cross-border arbitration.  
 
When a key procedural question eludes the parties’ agreement, either expressly or by reference 
to rules, arbitrators called to decide the quarrel often look to international standards as one 
analytic tool to balance efficiency and fairness.  On many topics a reasonable consensus 
indicates shared pre-dispute expectations.  Written witness statements stand as evidence in chief, 
with oral hearings devoted to cross-examination.  Pre-trial discovery restricts itself to narrow and 
specific categories of documents.  And the deontology of modern arbitration normally precludes 
ex parte communication about the case between arbitrator and counsel.  By contrast, a common 
culture eludes other questions, such as when and why the loser should pay legal costs of the 
prevailing party, a mater that has long divided British and American legal traditions.   
 
Neither the nature nor the limits of “soft law” always present themselves with clarity.  One 
salient illustration lies in the challenges faced by arbitrators applying doctrines of res judicata.  
When will an earlier judgment or award bind an arbitrator deciding a later case?  Although most 
legal systems impose some finality for prior decisions, differences remain on many questions, 
including the preclusive effect of reasoning (as opposed to holding) and the right to relief on a 
theory that could have been, but was not, asserted in an earlier action.  Often the litigants’ 
agreement fails to provide standards on controverted questions whose answers fall beyond 
common practice.  In such instances, the integrity of the process requires a healthy humility from 
scholars and practitioners professing to summarize arbitral standards.  
 
I. Soft Law in International Arbitration 
When people talk about law, they usually invoke governmental instruments such as statutes, 
court cases, treaties, and administrative regulations.  Increasingly, however, the field of 
international arbitration has witnessed the appearance of a “soft law” derived from an emerging 
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legal culture common to participants in the arbitral process.1  These principles build on 
institutional rules and professional guidelines addressing procedural questions such as 
presentation of evidence and conflicts of interest.2  Examples include International Bar 
Association pronouncements (fixing rules on taking of evidence and ethical conduct),3 along 
with the International Law Association recommendations on matters such as res judicata and 
applicable law.4  
On some topics “soft law” addresses problems lying in the interstices between substantive 
norms and arbitral procedure.  A notable example presents itself in the body of awards 
addressing when arbitration clauses extend to non-signatories, a matter encompassing arbitral 
practice as well as contract law principles on doctrines like agency or estoppel.5  
Some scholars object to the term “soft law” seeing law as having a binary character, either 
on or off, lacking a dimmer making norms brighter or darker.6  In this connection, the legitimacy 
                                                 
1 On the culture of international arbitration, to which we shall later revert in more detail, see 
generally JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF CONTRACT LAW (2013). 
2 See e.g., HANNEKE VAN SCHOOTEN & JONATHAN VERSCHUUREN, INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND LAW STATE REGULATION AND NON-STATE LAW 19 (2008); William W. Park, 
Procedural Default Rules Revisited, in ARBITRATION INSIGHTS:  TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL 
LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas A. 
Mistelis, eds. 2007). 
3 IBA, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014); IBA 
RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010); IBA, GUIDELINES 
ON PARTY REPRESENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2013).  See also COLLEGE OF 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (James 
M. Gaitis, Carl F. Ingwalson, Jr. & Vivien B. Shelanski, eds. 3rd ed. 2013). 
4 See generally Filip de Ly & Audley Sheppard, ILA Final Report on Res Judicata in Arbitration, 
25 ARB. INT’L 63 (2009); International Law Association International Commercial Arbitration 
Committee’s Report and Recommendations on Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law 
in International Commercial Arbitration, 26 ARB. INT’L 193 (2010).    
5 See William W. Park, Non-signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, 
in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, 2009), adapted n WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
DISPUTES 297 (2d Ed 2012) (Chapter II-A-6). 
6 THOMAS SCHULTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LEGALITY:  STATELESS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 18-19 (2014); W. Michael Reisman, Soft Law and Law Jobs, 2 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 26-27 (2011).  Compare Reisman’s earlier exploration of “micro legal systems” 
such as staring or standing in line:  W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999). 
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of “soft law” has been obscured by conflation of two notions.  On the one hand, an inappropriate 
form of “soft law” seeks simply a fig leaf to hide an arbitrator’s idiosyncratic personal 
preferences, pressed into service to justify derogation from a duty to apply relevant and 
predictable norms.  On the other hand, “soft law” which represents a fruit of careful thought by 
experienced practitioners, hailing from different legal cultures, provides a tool to help fill 
procedural gaps on matters like document production, witness statements and conflicts of 
interest.7   
Debate on the nature of “soft law” recalls the proverbial controversy over whether public 
international is really “law” in the same sense as national law.  Clearly, differences exist.  The 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, protecting buyers of footwear in Boston shops, differs 
in quality from the customary “law of nations” elaborated through state practice on maritime 
boundaries and diplomatic protection.8     
Yet each category of law serves a similar purpose.  Each legal system assists those entrusted 
with authoritative dispute resolution by providing information on community expectations, 
substantive and procedural.   
Much the same might be said of “soft law” norms.  To ask whether the different legal orders 
should be lumped together as “law” may be a bit like inquiring whether chess should be called a 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Soft Law in International Arbitration:  Codification and 
Normativity, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTL’T 283, 297 (2010) (“It is clear from these developments that 
soft law enjoys some degree of normativity, which could be called soft normativity. This 
normativity may be considered soft because soft law exercises a certain influence and is regarded 
with deference without being perceived as mandatory in the classic sense of the word.”); see also 
Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Soft Law Guides Parties on Procedures in 
International Arbitration, 24 March 2011 New York Law Journal NYLJ p.3, col.1 Volume 245; 
Issue 56 (2011); THOMAS STIPANOWICH, SOFT LAW IN THE ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL 
CONDUCT OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407187. 
8  To expand the analogy, one notes that English legal tradition differs in significant ways from 
foundations of law in Continental Europe, the latter restricting law-making power of courts, an 
attitude derived from anxiety in Revolutionary France over judicial tyranny in the ancien régime.  
Article 5 of French Code civil forbids judges from purporting to make general rules: “Il est 
défendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition générale et réglementaire sur les causes 
qui leur sont soumises.”  (It is forbidden for judges to decide cases submitted to them by general 
or regulatory dispositions.)  In practice, of course, French judges remain mindful of hierarchy, 
often citing scholarly summaries.  See generally, Denis TALLON, PRECEDENT, IN DICTIONNAIRE 
DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE 1185-1187 (2003).     
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game.  Chess differs dramatically from baseball, football, squash and tennis, involving little 
vigorous physical activity, and lacking round objects to throw or to hit.  Yet chess, just like 
baseball, football, squash and tennis, represents activity engaged in for amusement to which 
common parlance assigns “game” as a generic tag. 
Sometimes “soft law” dovetails into hard law, finding its way into national court cases to fill 
procedural interstices.9  This has happened, for example, in American cases involving judicial 
annulment of awards for “evident partiality”10 and non-disclosure of negotiations with one side 
to the proceedings.11  Thus soft-law instruments give rise to hard-law rulings providing guidance 
to emerging norms of a more permanent character. 
 
II. Content of Soft Law  
A. Easy Cases 
Determining its content of “soft law” will be easier in some instances than in others.12  
Some cases implicate relatively strong consensus among practitioners and scholars about what 
                                                 
9  Compare George A. Bermann, “International Standards” as a Choice of Law Option in 
International Commercial Arbitration, LIBER AMICORUM EN L’HONNEUR DE WILLIAM LAURENCE 
CRAIG 17 (2016), listing a category of topics that includes joinder of non-signatories and the 
waiver of a right to arbitrate.  
10 See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. (AIMCOR) v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 
2006 WL 1816383, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2006) aff’d 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007). In 
vacating an award for arbitrator failure to investigate relevant business contacts with one party’s 
affiliate, the district court made reference to the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest as well as 
the American Arbitration Association Code of Ethics of Arbitrators. 
11 See New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc.501 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2007), 
upholding challenge to an award between a film distribution company and production company, 
where the arbitrator failed to disclose work as a senior executive with a company negotiating 
with one of the parties to finance a motion picture.  The Ninth Circuit stated that although the 
IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest are “not binding authority and do not have the force of 
law, when considered along with an attorney’s traditional duty to avoid conflicts of interest, they 
reinforce [the conclusion] that a reasonable impression of partiality can form when an actual 
conflict of interest exists and the lawyer has constructive knowledge of it.” Id. at 1110. 
12 Larry A. DiMatteo, Soft Law and the Principle of Fair and Equitable Decision Making in 
International Contract Arbitration, 1 CHIN. J. COMP. L. 221, 234 (2013), quoting COMMITMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
30-1 (Dinah Shelton, ed. 2000).  
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represents best practice, where rules and guidelines have crossed the line from the parties’ will in 
a particular case to a broader consensus on related scenarios.13    
In the category of generally accepted rules one might list principles on disclosure and witness 
statements, where a broad consensus has arisen that document requests must be tailored more 
narrowly than in United States courts, even if broader in scope than in France or Switzerland.  
Similarly, it will be rare to find direct testimony in an international arbitration given orally rather 
than through written witness statements, with evidentiary hearings devoted to cross examination.  
In each of these areas, consensus among different legal traditions yielded a hybrid of 
transnational procedure, initially generated in the lore of international arbitration as presented in 
symposia speeches and professional articles, with codification through efforts of professional 
associations articulating common traditions and industry standard.14   
Another example presents itself in the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest, which aim to 
summarize commonly accepted practices in international arbitration, with reasonable arbitrators 
consulting the Guidelines prior to making decisions on disclosure.  Arbitral institutions like the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) often refer to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts 
of Interest for guidance on the parameters of required independence and impartiality.15 
Things which go without saying may go even better said.  Memorialization of a general 
practice conveys useful information to those entering the community.  Although seasoned 
                                                 
13 Paula Hodges, The Proliferation of “Soft Laws” in International Arbitration: Time to Draw 
the Line?, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2015 205 (Christian 
Klausegger et al. eds., 2015) (“These guidelines and rules seek to codify best, or at least 
internationally accepted, practice and to offer parties the chance to introduce a degree of 
consistency and predictability to the arbitral process.”).  In some instances, however, guidelines 
go beyond consensus. See William W. Park, A Fair Fight:  Professional Guidelines in 
International Arbitration, 30 ARB. INT’L 409, 419 (2014).  . 
14 See e.g., Detlev Kuhner, The Revised IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International 
Arbitration, 27 J. INT’L. ARB. 667, 667 (2010) (“Reference to the IBA Rules [on the Taking of 
Evidence] has steadily increased over the last decade; as a result it may be said, without 
exaggeration, that the IBA Rules have developed into a commonly accepted standard in 
international arbitration proceedings.”); Raymond Bender, Presenting Witness Testimony in U.S. 
Domestic Arbitration: Should Written Witness Statements Become the Norm?, DISP. RES. J., 
2014, Vol.69(4), 39-58. 
15 See Thomas W. Walsh & Ruth Teitelbaum, The LCIA Court Decisions on Challenges to 
Arbitrators: An Introduction, 27 ARB. INT’L 283 (2011). 
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arbitrators rarely attempt ex parte communications with counsel,16 not all arbitrators possess the 
same experience.  Until 2004, practice in the United States presumed party-nominated arbitrators 
to be non-neutral and thus allowed unilateral communication with their appointers.   
Even today, the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce remain silent on 
ex parte communications.   In one case, an arbitrator doing his first ICC arbitration objected that 
nothing prohibited him from talking alone to his appointer.  While this was true under those 
rules, a unilateral information lead would have threatened the integrity of the arbitration.  Thus 
the presiding arbitrator’s only recourse was to tender a resignation, hardly an easy path.17   
B. Harder Cases 
Sometimes “soft law” norms must address more difficult cases.  One example would be the 
relationships of one British barrister to another for conflicts of interest purposes.  Barristers’ 
chambers will not generally be equated with American law firms, in that barristers share 
expenses but not profits.  Understandably, however, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
include shared chambers as one item for disclosure, under the so-called “orange list” of 
situations which may, depending on circumstances, give rise to doubts about an arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence.18 
Overlap can exist between “soft law” and the parties’ agreement, particularly in reference to 
institutional rules.  Article 18.3 of the 2014 LCIA Rules contains a provision permitting an 
arbitral tribunal to disqualify counsel because of a change in representation that occurs late in the 
proceedings.  Concern arises when a respondent surprises a tribunal by appearing at oral hearings 
represented by an individual from the same firm or chambers as an arbitrator, thus putting into 
                                                 
16 See Canon III An arbitrator or prospective arbitrator should not discuss a proceeding with any 
party in the absence of any other party; see also Ben H. Sheppard, A New Era of Arbitrator 
Ethics for the United States: The 2004 Revision to the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators 
in Commercial Disputes (“Discussion of the merits of the case is specifically prohibited.”).  The 
European tradition has long condemned ex parte communication between counsel and the 
arbitrators.  Until recently, however, American practice presumed party-nominated arbitrators to 
be non-neutral and thus permitted ex parte communication with.   
17 William W. Park, A Fair Fight: Professional Guidelines in International Arbitration, 30 ARB. 
INT’L 409, 415 (2014).  
18  Section 3.3.2 of the Guidelines defines a disclosable relationship to include one where two 
arbitrators, and an arbitrator and counsel for one side, share same barristers’ chambers. 
7 
 
question the integrity of the proceedings.  In this respect, the parties’ agreement to LCIA Rules 
tracks earlier decisions giving a tribunal power to police such behavior.19  
Difficult situations can arise with respect to procedural norms which share rough analogues, 
yet on closer examination also diverge sharply in detail.  Attorney-client privilege in the United 
States shares common attributes with professional secrecy in some parts of Europe.  However, 
in-house counsel in Switzerland and Germany do not qualify as lawyers for that purpose.  Bar 
association rules there require an independence considered incompatible with a salaried 
relationship.20  Thus communications between managers of American companies and their in-
house lawyers might be privileged,21 while similar information would not be protected in 
communication between managers and legal departments in European corporations.22  An 
arbitrator might be faced with the need to devise rules on privilege which respect equality of 
arms between the two sides, while recognizing that notions diverge dramatically on what it 
means to be a lawyer for purposes of professional secrecy.    
The allocation of costs also proves fertile breeding ground for conflicts, as between contract 
terms and applicable law, as well as among legal cultures.  England restricts attempts to avoid 
the “loser pays” principle, sometimes termed “fee shifting” for legal expenses and arbitrator fees.  
In advance of the dispute, parties may not tell an arbitrator to allocate costs in disregard of who 
wins.  In contrast, the so-called “American rule” expects each side to pay its own costs regardless 
of the litigation outcome, absent abuse or frivolous conduct.23  The English provision casts a 
wide net, catching even informed arrangements between sophisticated managers.24 
                                                 
19 See Hrvatska Elektropriveda, dd v. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (2008). 
20 In Switzerland, the notion of lawyer (avocat / Rechtsanwalt) depends on activity of an 
independent character. Employment as an in-house counsel disqualifies from lawyer status. See 
Article 231, Code Pénal and Article 13, Loi fédérale sur la libre circulation des avocats (23 June 
2000), establishing the obligation of professional secrecy. See also Article 29 of the Loi fédérale 
d’organisation judiciaire (limiting a right to represent clients to practicing lawyers and 
university professors). See Peter Burckhardt, Legal Professional Secrecy and Privilege in 
Switzerland, IBA Int’l Litigation News 33 (Oct. 2004); Bernard Corboz, Le Secret professionnel 
de l’avocat selon l’article 321 CP, Semaine Judiciaire 77 (1993). 
21 See, e.g., NCK Organization Ltd v. Bregman, 542 F. 2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976). 
22 See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 378 (2002).  
23   See Section 60, Arbitration Act of 1996.  Section 61 goes on to set forth the general principle 
that “costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the 
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III. Res Judicata:  Consensus and Divergence 
A. The Arbitrator’s Dilemma  
As arbitral “soft law”, notions of res judicata pose special intellectual challenges.  From 
one legal culture to another, the nature of res judicata carries both considerable consensus and 
deep divergence.25  The core principle of res judicata (from Latin for “a thing adjudged”) holds 
that the same case should not be litigated twice.  Thus the first decision will be considered as 
binding.    
To say that a tribunal should recognize principles of res judicata begs the question of 
which version of that doctrine the arbitrators should implement.  Although national law generally 
operates in harmony with two cases involving several classical unities (same parties, same claim, 
and same legal theory),26 divergence exists among legal systems in defining and in applying 
those unities.    
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs.”  This standard, 
however, is made subject to the parties’ agreement otherwise, which in context with Section 60 
would be an agreement after the dispute has arisen.  The rule’s most understandable application 
lies in an anti-abuse mechanism to prevent clauses that would require weaker parties to pay all 
costs, thus discouraging otherwise legitimate claims.  See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a 
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 J. LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 9 (1984); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:  The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1576 (1993); Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 
38 YALE L. J. 849 (1929). 
24 Imagine, for example, that an international contract provides for arbitration in London but with 
New York law applicable to interpret the agreement.  The contract also stipulates that each side 
bears its own legal costs. A conscientious arbitrator falls between Scylla and Charybdis, faced 
with inconsistent mandates from the law of the arbitral situs and the applicable substantive law.  
Aiming at fidelity to the parties’ contract, an arbitrator may let the costs lie where they fall.  To 
do so, however, risks award annulment in London.  The contrary course, allocating expenses in 
disregard of the parties’ agreement, carries its own risk in the form of annulment for excess of 
arbitral authority as viewed by a New York court asked to enforce an award contrary to clearly 
accepted contract provisions and the party-selected substantive law.     
25 Notions of res judicata take various formulations in different legal systems, such as the literal 
“chose jugée” in France and the concept of “Rechtskräftig” in German, whereby a a judgment 
takes on “formelle Rechtskraft” see ZPO Articles 704 -707.   
26 See generally, Audley Sheppard, Res Judicata and Estoppel, in PARALLEL STATE AND 
ARBITRAL PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 219, 224 (Bernardo M. Cremades & 
Julian D.M. Lew, eds., 2005); Kaj Hobér, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens in International 
Arbitration, 366 RECUEIL DES COURS 99, 121 (2013) (“Despite the general acceptance of res 
judicata, and its constituent parts, there are . . . significant differences between legal systems.”); 
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For example, American jurisdictions often follow a transactional method, precluding a 
second litigation arising from the same occurrence, even if raised on a different theory and 
implicating slightly different facts.27  Thus if a claimant could have brought five causes of action 
but presented only four (excluding a fraud claim, for example), the omitted theory will normally 
be barred in a second action.   Moreover, American jurisdictions generally endorse what has 
been called “issue preclusion” (collateral estoppel) which binds a party to a determination of a 
matter of law or contract construction, even in a later case on a different cause of action.   
By contrast, Continental courts often deny binding effect to the reasoning of an earlier 
decision, even between the same parties as to related claims.  Illustrative in this connection, a 
decision of Switzerland’s highest court addressed the relationship between two arbitral awards 
concerning performance under the same contract by the same individual, but for different years.  
The Swiss approach (unlike that of many American jurisdictions) denied binding effect to the 
contract interpretation in first award.28  
Judges who address res judicata usually look to the law of the forum, consulting published 
cases, civil procedure codes, and scholarly writings relating to their own jurisdiction.  In some 
cases, arbitrators also will also be able to apply the norms of a given substantive legal system 
agreed by the two sides.   
Not always, however.   In many instances the path for arbitrators will prove less certain, due 
to ambiguity in the parties’ choice-of-law provision.    
In such instances, one path not normally be open to a conscientious arbitrator or scholar 
would be the invention of a purported procedural standard where no established principles in fact 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, The Role of Precedent in Defining Res Judicata 
in Investor-State Arbitration, 32 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 419, 423 (2012). 
27 See, e.g. Edcare Management v. Delisi, 50 A.3d 448 (D.C. Court of Appeals, 2012), barring 
actions against a hospital on a tort after an arbitration award issued for breach of contract; also 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (Am. Law. Inst. 1982);  
28  See Swiss Tribunal Fédéral/Bundesgericht, ATF/BGE, 4A_633/2014, 29 May 2015, 
discussed infra.  A dispute between an American firm and one of its German partners led to a 
first award in Frankfurt addressing years 2009 and 2010, and a second award in Zürich 
concerning 2011 and 2012.  See generally, Charles Poncet & Luisa Mockler, Res Judicata:  A 
Contribution to the Debate on Claim Preclusion in International Arbitration, in LIBER 
AMICORUM EN L’HONNEUR DE WILLIAM LAURENCE CRAIG 309, at 311 (2016) (“The preclusive 
effects of a judgment in Switzerland are strictly interpreted to attach only to the dispositive part 
of the decision.”). 
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exist.  Even the most sincere convictions about the best policy should not parade as disguised 
advocacy.  Absent special authorization by the parties (such as a power of amiable composition) 
arbitrators remain law appliers, not law makers.   
The starting point for commercial arbitrators seeking guidance would normally be the 
litigants’ agreement itself. It will always be possible for the contracting parties to include a 
provision such as “questions of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion will be governed by the 
civil procedure law of Indiana.”   
The choice-of-law clause will not always, however, be drafted with such precision.  Having 
come to the end of a long negotiation, when things are finalized at 2:18 in the morning after hard 
fighting on the basic commercial terms of price and delivery, the contracting parties will 
sometimes content themselves with simply stating, “Contract interpreted according to the law of 
New York.”  On its face, such a clause may not say much about issue preclusion. 
In some instances, however, the contracting parties will go further, providing more than 
simply rules for contract construction.  The relevant clause might say, for example, “The 
Contract and any matter arising therefrom, as well as the determination of any dispute related to 
this transaction, shall be governed by the laws of Massachusetts.” From such a clause the 
arbitrators would likely find more assistance. 
On occasion, reference to particular arbitration rules may be of assistance.  Certain rules 
require awards to be reasoned, causing some commentators to argue that by agreeing to such 
rules, parties implicitly accept that the reasons given in an earlier award bind them in subsequent 
proceedings.29  At least one arbitration institution revised its rules to reflect this approach 
explicitly.30   
B. Points of Divergence:  National Law 
                                                 
29 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 31(2) (specifying that the award will contain reasons for 
tribunal’s decision), 34(6) (stating that the award will be binding).  See also discussion, infra,  
Apotex II Award, ¶7.33, noting Respondent’s submission on the combined effect of Articles 
32(2) and 32(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, whereby reasons in the earlier award 
would have effect res judicata as between the Parties just as much as its operative part.   
30 LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014, Article 26(8), providing “every award (including reasons for 
such award) shall be binding on the parties.” 
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1. Overview  
When the choice-of-law clause leaves loose ends, the arbitrators may be urged to adopt some 
transnational solution, whether labelled “soft law” or something such as international arbitral 
procedure.  The content of any such principles, however, will not always yield to facile analysis.   
National systems, like public international law and scholarly commentary,31 recognize 
some res judicata principle as extended to arbitral awards.32   Major legal jurisdictions usually 
look to certain “identities” that precludes re-litigation, such as (i) the same parties; (ii) the claim 
(petita) (also referenced as “object”, “subject matter”, “cause of action” or “prayer for relief”), 
and  (iii) the same legal theory (causa petendi).   
Consensus does not go much further, however.  Many civil law countries understand 
claim (petita) narrowly as a relief sought, permitting a litigant to get a second bite at an apple.  In 
contrast, as discussed below, for common law jurisdictions the notion of “same claim” has often 
been viewed broadly, so as to open doors for preclusive effect of the earlier court’s determination 
of issues and reasoning, or the legal and factual premises on which a ruling rests.33   
                                                 
31 See e.g., Sections 4-9 and 4-10 of American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third:  The 
U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration. 
32 Kaj Hobér, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens in International Arbitration, 366 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 99, 120 (2013); Gretta Walters, Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Do Res Judicata 
Challenges in International Arbitration Constitute Jurisdictional or Admissibility Problems?, 29 
J. INT’L ARB. 652, 652 (2012); Audley Sheppard, Res Judicata and Estoppel, in PARALLEL 
STATE AND ARBITRAL PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 219 (Bernardo M. 
Cremades & Julian D.M. Lew, eds., 2005) (“As well as applying in national court proceedings, 
res judicata is a well-recognized principle of international law.”); Waste Management v. Mexico, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, ¶39 (2June 2002), 41 ILM 1315 (2002) (“There is no doubt that 
res judicata is a principle of international law.”); Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, 
The Role of Precedent in Defining Res Judicata in Investor-State Arbitration, 32 NW. J. INT’L & 
BUS. 419, 421 (2012); Vaughan Lowe, Res Judicata and the Rule of Law in International 
Arbitration, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 38, 40 (1996). 
33 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Res Judicata and International Arbitral Awards, in Post Award 
Issues, ASA Special Series no. 38, at 127 (P. Tercier, ed., 2011) (“The consensus does not go 
much further.  Indeed, most of the crucial issues relevant for the solution of concrete problems 
remain open.”); SILJA SCHAFFSTEIN, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ¶1.118 (2016) (discussing French understanding of civil 
procedure); HANNO WEHLAND, THE COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION 6.64 (2013) (discussing res judicata in international law and noting that 
petitum as “requested relief” is closer to civil law tradition); Kaj Hobér, Res Judicata and Lis 
Pendens in International Arbitration, 366 RECUEIL DES COURS 99, 121 (2013) (“Despite the 
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2. Claim Preclusion 
Broadly speaking, claim preclusion prevents parties from rearguing a claim already 
decided by a competent decision-maker.  In civil law countries the element of claim (petita) has 
often been interpreted narrowly, causing some to suggest a party must seek identical relief in the 
second case in order to trigger res judicata.34 Some countries require that the second claim be 
founded in the same legal theory, a reading of the “unities” in res judicata that may cause a 
slight modification in a prayer for relief to prevent preclusive effect to the earlier decision.35   
In German law, it appears that subsequent proceedings may be permitted where the 
parties request different relief albeit arising from the same factual circumstances.36  Thus a car 
accident victim is not precluded from bringing a later case for property damages after an earlier 
the judgment for personal injury, even though both losses resulted from the same occurrence.37    
A similar approach seems to be taken in Switzerland where notions of “claim” would be 
interpreted narrowly, covering only prayers for relief.38 
                                                                                                                                                             
general acceptance of res judicata, and its constituent parts, there are . . . significant differences 
between legal systems.”). 
34 See ILA Report p. 52 (discussing French approach). 
35 Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, The Role of Precedent in Defining Res 
Judicata in Investor-State Arbitration, 32 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 419, 427 (2012).  Some might 
suggest that difference between civil and common law traditions derives from an emphasis, in 
civil law jurisdictions, on a judicial search for truth rather than resolution of a dispute between 
two adversaries. The former approach requires a more active role of the court and could perceive 
a broad notion of res judicata as an unnecessary limitation on judicial authority.  See Keith A. 
Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y. L. REV. 911, 929 
(2011). 
36 See JACOB VAN DE VELDEN & JUSTINE STEFANELLI, COMPARATIVE REPORT: THE EFFECT IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, 
RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS 16 (2006), 
http://www.biicl.org/files/4608_comparative_report_-_jls_2006_fpc_21_-_final.pdf.    
37 CHRISTIAN A. HEINZE, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL 
AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS 18 & 21 
(2006), http://www.biicl.org/files/3482_germany_final_c.pdf.  It may be that civil law traditions 
reject a broad scope for preclusion due to the more active role of civil law judges in case 
administration.  See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the 
Truth, 56 N.Y. L. REV. 911, 929 (2011). 
38   It has been suggested that in Switzerland a judgment dismissing a contract claim not 
precluding the same damages sought based on the same facts but asserted in later proceedings 
based on an alleged tort.   PAUL OBERHAMMER & URS H. HOFFMANN-NOWOTNY, THE EFFECT IN 
13 
 
For claim preclusion to apply, some civil law countries, appear to require an identity of 
the legal cause of action and the relief claimed,39 although commentators have noted that neither 
relief nor cause of action is clearly defined in French law.40 Moreover, although civil law claim 
preclusion has traditionally been narrower than analogous common law concepts, some 
Continental jurisdictions show a disposition towards “concentration of claims” which expands 
the notion of claim or object of proceedings.41  
In common law systems, res judicata takes a more transactional hue, with transaction 
understood broadly as facts giving rise to a remedy, thereby precluding a second bite at the apple 
with respect to the same basic occurrence.42  A claim comprises rights with respect to all or any 
part of a series of connected events from which the action arose.  43 
                                                                                                                                                             
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: 
RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS (SWITZERLAND) 18 (2006), 
http://www.biicl.org/files/3487_switzerland_final_c.pdf.    
39 Hobér, supra, at 131; JACOB VAN DE VELDEN & JUSTINE STEFANELLI, COMPARATIVE REPORT: 
THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS 16 (2006), 
http://www.biicl.org/files/4608_comparative_report_-_jls_2006_fpc_21_-_final.pdf; SILJA 
SCHAFFSTEIN, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ¶1.118 (2016) (the need for parties in both proceedings to ask for the same 
thing and assert the same rights). 
40 EMMANUEL JEULAND, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL 
AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS (FRANCE) 23 
(2006), http://www.biicl.org/files/3481_france_final_c.pdf; see also SILJA SCHAFFSTEIN, THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
¶1.116 (2016) (explaining that in France the exact notion of “identity of object” remains 
uncertain).   
41 SILJA SCHAFFSTEIN, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ¶1.124 & 1.126 and n.259 (2016), discussing Cesareo v. Cesareo, Cour de 
cassation, 7 July 2006, where in the first action the plaintiff brought a claim for deferred wages, 
while in the second case he claimed unjust enrichment and noting that Cour de cassation held 
that both claims were based on identical causes.  (“[B]y imposing on the parties an obligation to 
raise all possible legal grounds underlying their claim in the first action . . . the position of the 
Cour de cassation . . .  also echoes the US doctrine of claim preclusion.”) 
42 See ILA Interim Report, at 36, 52. 
43 See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986), emphasizing that 
transaction is understood as “a single core of operative facts' which give[s] rise to a remedy”.  
Thus when a set of facts causes injury all claims arising from that transaction must be brought in 
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English law takes the approach that all claims arising from a single event and relying on 
the same evidence will be treated as the same cause of action.  Other than for fraud or collusion, 
there may be no re-litigation of the action on grounds not raised in the earlier proceedings.44 The 
identity of causes of action is determined as a matter of substance.  The cause of action consists 
of all facts and circumstances necessary to give rise to relief.  
Courts in the United States American courts take a similar approach to claim 
preclusion.45.  New York courts explained that “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all 
other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based 
upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.”46  Moreover, when alternative theories 
are available to recover what is essentially the same relief for harm arising out of the same or 
related facts, the mere existence of different elements of proof will not justify presenting the 
claim by different actions.  
Federal court dictum in the United States seems to have affirmed this approach.  In 
Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority,47 Citigroup and Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) were parties to the Investment Agreement, pursuant to which ADIA invested 
in Citigroup.  Arguing that Citigroup by its actions diluted the value of the investment, ADIA 
                                                                                                                                                             
one suit or be lost.  The Court concluded that RICO claims were barred by res judicata doctrine 
because the earlier judgment addressed an antitrust suit arising from the same events. 
44 SPENSER BOWER AND HANDLEY, RES JUDICATA 94-95 (2009); see also SILJA SCHAFFSTEIN, 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
¶1.20 (2016) (citing Lord Diplock in Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232). 
45 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments requires that courts in defining a “transaction” for 
purposes of claim preclusion “giv[e] weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and 
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding 
or usage.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (Am. Law Inst. 1982); Yuval Sinai, 
Reconsidering Res Judicata: A Comparative Perspective, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 353, 359 
(2011). See Edcare Management v. Delisi, 50 A.3d 448 (D.C. Court of Appeals, 2012), 
discussed supra, where a tort action against a hospital by an emergency-care management 
agency, was held to barred after an arbitration award against the hospital for breach of contract.   
46 UBS Sec. LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 927 N.Y.S.2d 59, 64 (2011). 
47 776 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2015).  The Second Circuit held that the issue of res judicata must be 
left for the arbitrators to decide, rather than for the courts.  The holding itself was that the 
“extraordinary remedies” authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, does not permit a 
district court to enjoin an arbitration based on the claim-preclusive effect that may result a prior 
judgment that merely confirmed the earlier arbitration award without considering its merits. 
15 
 
initiated the arbitration and asserted several claims.48  The arbitrators found for Citigroup.  
Unsatisfied with the result, ADIA initiated the second arbitration asserting claims slightly 
different from those in the first arbitration, but also related to breach of contract the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   
Citigroup sought to enjoin the second arbitration invoking the doctrine of claim 
preclusion in the U.S. district court.  The district court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the arbitrators in the second arbitration should decide if ADIA’s second set of claims is barred by 
the doctrine of claim preclusion.  In passing, however, the Second Circuit explained that “the 
doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the subsequent litigation of any claims that 
were or could have been raised in a prior action.”49 
3. Issue Preclusion 
Unlike civil law countries, common law jurisdictions usually extend preclusive effect not 
only to the disposition part of the award but also to the award’s reasoning.50  This is done by 
means of issue preclusion, also called issue estoppel, a notion that precludes a party in 
subsequent proceedings from contradicting an issue of fact or the legal consequences already 
raised and decided in earlier proceedings.51   
Issue preclusion does not confer binding effect on every statement in the earlier award.  
However, a determination essential to the judgment would be conclusive in a subsequent action, 
whether on the same or a different claim.52   
                                                 
48 These claims sounded in fraud, securities fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
49 Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 776 F.3d 126, 128 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015). 
50 ILA Interim Report, at 42, 47.  Audley Sheppard, Res Judicata and Estoppel, in PARALLEL 
STATE AND ARBITRAL PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 219, 225 (Bernardo M. 
Cremades & Julian D.M. Lew, eds., 2005). 
51 S. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 38 (1897) (“A right, question, or fact distinctly put 
in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, 
cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and, even if the 
second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, 
as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established . . . .”). 
52 ILA Interim Report at 42, 47; V.V. Veeder, Issue Estoppel, Reasons for Awards and 
Transnational Arbitration, in Complex Arbitrations, Special Supplement 2003, ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin at 75 (quoting Mills v. Cooper [1967] 2 Q.B. 459 at 468-69). 
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In contrast, in civil law jurisdictions seem generally disposed to accept that an earlier 
judgment’s reasons are not binding in a second litigation.  Nevertheless, reasons may sometimes 
be taken into account to interpret the operative part of a prior judgment.53 
As mentioned earlier, a recent decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme in a dispute 
between an international law firm and its attorney illustrates a civil law approach to res 
judicata.54  One of the German partners of the U.S. law firms had a special arrangement 
concerning his remuneration in the Business Combination Agreement (BCA), which provided a 
“Floor Amount” representing minimum amount per annum payable to the partner.  The 
agreement subject to German law and contained an arbitration agreement providing for an 
arbitration under the ICC Rules in Zurich, Switzerland. 
The first arbitration concerning the payment for 2009-2010 between the German partner 
and the U.S. law firm was decided by the ICC Tribunal seated in Frankfurt.55 The Frankfurt 
tribunal denied lawyer’s claims.  In particular, the tribunal interpreted the BCA and indicated 
that the Floor Amount pursuant to Art. 5.2 BCA was owed only if a partner had fulfilled the 
prerequisites under the BCA providing for ‘activities, devotion and performance’ and concluded 
that the partner had not satisfied such prerequisites in the relevant period.   
Later the German partner initiated a second arbitration against the U.S. law based on the 
same contract, the same legal theory, but for a different time period:  2011 and 2012.  An ICC 
Tribunal seated Zurich offered a different interpretation of the BCA and found in favor of the 
partner notwithstanding the law firm arguments that the second tribunal was bound by the first 
tribunal’s finding as to the interpretation of the BCA.  The case reached the Swiss court when the 
U.S. law firm tried to set aside the award of the second tribunal. 
                                                 
53 See French civil code article 1351, limiting res judicata effect only the “dispositif” part of the 
award, roughly analogous to the “holding” in common law.  (L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu 
qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du jugement  Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même ; 
que la demande soit fondée sur la même cause ; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et 
formée par elles et contre elles en la même qualité.) 
54 Swiss ATF/BGE, 4A_633/2014, 29 May 2015. 




The Swiss Supreme Court concluded that the legal force of an arbitral award restricts 
itself to the dispositive portions, with considerations forming no part of res judicata regardless of 
the desirability of having transnational concepts applicable res judicata. 
4. Other Preclusive Doctrines 
Some countries developed other preclusive doctrines that go beyond traditional triple 
identity res judicata and nonetheless prevent litigants from taking inconsistent positions in 
subsequent cases.  In the United States a concept of judicial estoppel serves this preclusive role.  
Judicial estoppel as the traditional res judicata aims to protect the adjudicatory system from 
abusive use by the parties,56 promote fairness of dispute resolution and finality of judicial 
rulings, and purports to avoid inconsistent results.57  Although no uniform formulation of judicial 
estoppel exists in the United States, most states apply this doctrine when a party in an earlier case 
has relied on a position, accepted by the earlier court, which is incompatible with arguments in a 
second case.58   
American judicial estoppel bears some similarities to English doctrine on abuse of 
process, which precludes a party from raising in a subsequent proceeding issues that could have 
                                                 
56 George Klidonas & Keith R. Murphy, Judicial Estoppel Revisited, 31(5) AM. BANKR. 
INSTITUTE J. 18-19, 89-90 (2012). 
57 Eric A. Schreiber, Judicial Estoppel, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 326 (1997). 
58 Kira A. Davis, Judicial Estoppel and Inconsistent Positions of Law Applied to Fact and Pure 
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 191 (2003); Eric A. Schreiber, Judicial Estoppel, 30 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 323, 324 (1997).  Application of judicial estoppel might following if: (i) the same party 
took two positions; (ii) these positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (iii) 
the party was successful in adopting the first position, the tribunal accepting it as true; (iv) the 
two positions are inconsistent; and (vi) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, 
fraud or mistake.  See International Engine Parts Inc. v. Fedderson, 64 Cal. App. 4th 345 (Cal 
App. 1998); Aguilar v. Lerner, 32 Cal 4th 251 (Cal App. 2004). 
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been raised during a prior proceeding.59 Both doctrines aim to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system as well as parties’ interests in finality. 60  
In contrast, civil law countries seem less inclined to accept notions of judicial estoppel or 
abuse of process.  Nevertheless, in some instances the doctrine of abuse of rights (abus de droit) 
stands not far in function from English notion of abuse of process,61 although the French legal 
tradition may be more inclined to requiring the abusive party to pay damages rather than to 
dismiss the second set of claims62 
C. Public Law Standards:  Apotex as a Case Study  
The search for relatively clear standards of res judicata vexes public law disputes as well 
as commercial arbitration.  In recent NAFTA proceedings addressing expropriation, denial of 
national treatment, and violation of fair and equitable treatment, an arbitral tribunal had to 
grapple not only with the meaning of res judicata but also with the sources of authority for 
determining the contours of relevant doctrine. 
Three international arbitration claims were brought by the members of the same Canadian 
pharmaceutical group Apotex.  All alleged violations of Chapter 11 of the North American Free 
                                                 
59 Audley Sheppard, Res Judicata and Estoppel, in PARALLEL STATE AND ARBITRAL 
PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 219, 236 (Bernardo M. Cremades & Julian D.M. 
Lew, eds., 2005).    See also David A.R. Williams & Mark Tushingham, The Application of the 
Henderson v. Henderson Rule in International Arbitration, 26 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 1036 (2014), commenting on seminal English judgment concerning abuse of process, 
Henderson v. Henderson, 1844 6 QB 288.  Following a debt action in Newfoundland, a court in 
England refused to hear a defense that a widow was not entitled to sue in the name of her 
husband, since that argument could have been raised in the earlier action.  
60 ILA Interim Report, at 43 (“[T]he doctrine of abuse of process prescribes that subsequent 
proceedings should be precluded if it is necessary for a court to prevent a misuse of its procedure 
in the face of unfairness to another party, or to avoid the risk that the administration of justice 
might be brought into disrepute among right-thinking people.”); see also Arbitration Matters: 
Spring 2007, OSBORNE CLARKE (Apr. 19, 2007) http://www.osborneclarke.com/connected-
insights/publications/arbitration-matters-spring-2007/ (quoting Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co 
[2001] 1 All ER 481). 
61 Audley Sheppard, Res Judicata and Estoppel, in PARALLEL STATE AND ARBITRAL 
PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 219, 236 (Bernardo M. Cremades & Julian D.M. 
Lew, eds., 2005). 
62 EMMANUEL JEULAND, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL 
AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS (FRANCE) 33 
(2006), http://www.biicl.org/files/3481_france_final_c.pdf.  See also Michael Byers, Abuse of 
Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389, 392 (2002). 
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Trade Agreement.  All were decided pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 
ICSID Additional Facility.  In 2013, an initial award decided two different claims brought by 
Apotex which were heard concurrently, although not formally consolidated.  This Award held 
that the Canadian claimant did not qualify as an investor within the meaning of NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven.  Certain marketing authorizations (Abbreviated New Drug Applications or “ANDA’s”) 
were held not to constitute “investments” for purposes of NAFTA.63   
A little more than a year later, in a second arbitration,64 a different tribunal gave res 
judicata effect to the earlier award, dismissing for want of jurisdiction claims brought by the 
same Canadian group based on the same marketing authorizations.  As suggested by the dissent, 
one difference between the two sets of proceedings lay in the fact that the marketing 
authorizations relevant to the later award had been given final approval by the United States 
authorities, as contrasted with tentative approval to the authorizations considered in the earlier 
arbitrations.65 
In both sets of claims, the Canadian group manufactured generic drugs for export to the 
United States pursuant to authorizations permitting exclusive sales of certain generic drugs for 
six months following expiration of patents for the brand name drugs.  In an arbitration seated in 
New York addressing the duration of exclusivity period, the first tribunal found that the 
marketing authorizations could not be considered property within the scope of NAFTA Chapter 
11, thus permitting no jurisdiction over claims by Apotex.66 
The facts giving rise to the second award were slightly different, in that the United 
States FDA issued an import alert which prevented importation of drugs produced in certain 
                                                 
63  So-called Apotex I & II, Award rendered on 14 June 2013. 
64  Apotex Holdings Inc. & Apotex Inc. v. USA, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/12/1, decided 25 August 
2014 (ICSID Additional Facility, UNCITRAL Rules).  Tribunal of V.V. Veeder, John R. Crook 
and J. William Rowley, with Rowley dissenting in part.  A certain confusion sometimes creeps 
into discussion of these decisions.  Three cases were brought, but only two awards were 
rendered.  The 2013 Award addressed claims in Apotex I and Apotex II, and the 2014 award 
addressed claims in the Apotex III.  To avoid unduly muddling analysis, the present discussion 
generally employs the labels “2013 Award” and “2014 Award”.  
65 Apotex 2014 Award, at ¶2.53. 
66 Apotex 2013 Award, ¶358, finding “Apotex does not qualify as an ‘investor’, who has made 
an ‘investment’ in the U.S., for the purposes of NAFTA Articles 1116 and 1139, and accordingly 
both the Sertraline and Pravastatin Claims are hereby dismissed in their entirety, on the basis that 
the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in relation thereto.” 
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facilities.  The claimants again alleged breaches of treaty-granted protections for NAFTA 
investors.   
In response, the United States argued that the marketing authorizations were not within 
the definition of investment set out in NAFTA.  This argument rested on an assumption that res 
judicata effect extended the reasoning of the first award, which defined “investment” for 
NAFTA purposes, rather than simply the dispositive portions relating to similar although 
different marketing authorizations.   
By a majority vote, the 2014 Award held that that Apotex was barred from re-litigating 
the question of whether the marketing authorizations qualified as investments under NAFTA.  
Trying to avoid making any clear choice for a the broader “common law” approach rather than 
the stricter “civil law” tradition, the 2014 award purported to discern no “sharp divide between 
these two legal systems,” finding instead that courts and tribunals deciding cases under 
international law have taken account of a prior tribunal’s “reasoning, and the argument it 
considered, in determining the scope, and thus the preclusive effect, of the prior award’s 
operative part.”67  The majority found the reasoning of the 2013 award to be an integral part of 
its determination.68  Consequently, the tribunal did not, in its view, apply the first award’s 
reasons independently from its operative part.69 
IV. Conclusion 
The observation that the life of the law remains logic rather than experience applies with 
special force in exploring the role of “soft law” for cross-border arbitration.  In elaborating 
                                                 
67 Apotex 2014 Award, ¶¶7.18 & 7.23. 
68 Apotex 2014 Award, ¶7.35.  A careful observer will note that even absent res judicata the 
tribunal said it would have reached the same conclusion, finding that Apotex Inc. never had any 
“presence, activity or other investment in the territory of the USA, including the non-payment of 
any relevant US taxes.”  Id. ¶7.62. 
69 The Tribunal found additional support for its decision in choice of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules for the first set of arbitration proceedings, which in Article 32 make an award final and 
binding and also requires a tribunal to state reasons on which the award is based. It was 
Respondent’s case that the combined effect of those two parts of Article 32 meant that the 
reasons in the first award had as much effect as its operative part.  The Tribunal ultimately did 
not have to rely on this argument, but did express an inclination “to accept this submission as a 
matter of legal logic.”   Id. at ¶7.35.  See generally, Charles T. Kotuby Jr. & James A. Egerton-
Vernon, Apotex Holdings Inc and Apotex Inc v The Government of the United States of America, 
30(3) ICSID REV. 486, 487 (2015), suggesting that the 2014 award accepted collateral estoppel 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
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international standards, sound analysis requires both restraint and rigor in ascertaining those 
principles which have, and have not, found consensus in the international community.   Just as 
general propositions do not necessarily decide concrete cases, the propositions themselves will 
often prove stubbornly elusive. 
In this connection, arbitrators often face particular challenges in finding res judicata 
principles without express application of a national legal tradition.  Most legal systems accord 
some degree of finality to a prior judgment or award.  Less agreement exists, however, with 
respect to questions the preclusive effect of reasoning, rather than result, and the definition of 
claims decided.70   
On any particular topic, prophecy remains highly problematic with respect to both when 
and how compromise will evolve to bridge the gap between legal cultures.  A measure of 
modesty befits any attempt to portray or to pronounce cross-border consensus.  
                                                 
70 See generally Pierre Mayer, Autorité de la chose jugée et arbitrage (Colloque du Comité 
français de l’arbitrage, Paris 23 Oct 2015), 2016 Revue de l’Arbitrage 91; Stavros Brekoulakis, 
The Effect of an Arbitral Award and Third Parties in International Arbitration:  Res judicata 
revisited.16 Am. Rev of Int’l Arb 1 (2005). 
 
